European Union

On May 7^th and 8^th , the Czech presidency of the European Union was able to reunite  the key players of Eastern Europe in the hopes of reestablishing ties between the EU and its ex-Soviet Union neighbors (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia and Ukraine) to help reinforce their independence and assure new sources of energy supplies.  The EU is trying, on a basis of pragmatic cooperation, to maintain European presence in these countries, which has lead to speculation that it is about to encroach on the sphere of Russian strategical interests.  But appearances are deceiving.

To begin, Europe does not have a strategic global vision, and it would be wrong to view the whole new oriental partnership as an attempt to diminish Russian influence.  Two factors support this point of view:

-         Firstly, the EU is not yet a powerful political/military force and prefers to cooperate with Russia in the handling of crises;

-         Secondly, the economic ties between Russia and its immediate neighbors are sufficiently strong, and the latter doesn’t want to risk such a market, which absorbs their industrial and agricultural products as well as millions of migrant workers, for a project whose future is still uncertain.

Although certain elements of the partnership remain promising, it is a long way off from making a useful contribution to the emergence of an economic pole in geopolitical pluralism within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It is more likely destined to promote relations between the EU and its partners and reinforce their integration in different means of cooperation but at the same level of interaction as with Russia. It is more a matter of complementarity of cooperation than of competition and more about reinforced integration than membership. It is for this reason that the affected States of the ex-USSR adopt a more reasonable approach even if Ukraine still hopes for full membership pure and simple.  The greatest weakness of this partnership is in fact the lack of means for its goals and above all, its incentives in terms of membership. 

Also, the new international context, which is linked to the multilateral approach and to the more pragmatic international policy of the new Obama Administration, tends to put Russia at ease. The new president is fixed on two priorities – Iran and Afghanistan – and is looking, in contrast to his predecessor, to avoid unnecessary provocations by notably abandoning the pursuit of the new version of the containment policy. This policy is aimed at reducing Russian sway by promoting “revolutions of colors”in the ex-Soviet sphere of influence, which were considered to be “natural steps” in the strategic vision of the Kremlin. This approach seems to suit Moscow, as it would be more advantageous for it to adopt a cooperative approach under the condition that it maintains its dominant position in its old guarded domain.  Behind this point of view, one can find a point of equilibrium in the relations between Russia and the United States. For example Washington renounced its unilateral initiative of antimissile shields in favor of a common project with Moscow, in which they engage in problematic affairs, such as those found in Iran and Afghanistan. This could allow for a reconfiguration of the power struggle, and it would assure Russia that it remains the major force in that region, allowing everyone a piece of the pie. Indeed, the help that Russia could bring the Iranian question would be enormous and fundamental for regional and international security. Iran seeks to become a regional power, putting itself in competition with NATO member and EU candidate Turkey, in order to, among other things, contain the influence of the UnitedState. The first trip of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after his reelection took him as invitee to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Yekaterinburg in the Ural. This organization was created in 1996 by Russia and China to be an alternative to NATO and in response to US influence in central Asia. Four central Asian countries are members, all the former Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, Kirghistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Iran holds an observer status. It is important to note, that in October 2007, the Caspian Summit in Teheran, held during the peak of the nuclear crisis, has been a success for Iran as well as for Russia.

            This agreeable arrangement with Russia could also contribute to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, one goal of the Obama Administration is to improve the American image in the Muslim world. In this context, Turkey is an ally not to be ignored in connecting American interests of becoming a regional player in the Middle East and also in the South Caucasus. Hence the American incentives to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia, that have been broken off in 1993 following the occupation of 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan by Armenian military forces. But this issue pre-requires diplomatic progress in finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which demands a more active role of the United States and Russia. However, the Russian motivations are different: first, by excluding such a possibility for the resolution of the Ossetian and Abkhazian conflict, Moscow continues its efforts to bring the Saakhashvili regime to its knees, again to ensure direct access to Armenia, its stronghold in the South Caucasus; then in the setting of a potential rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, the Kremlin thinks about balancing its relations with Azerbaijan, while encouraging them to sell the bulk of its natural gas to the Russian gas giant "Gazprom", which aims to challenge the European gas pipeline "Nabucco".

            Contrary to what one might think, Azerbaijan has not attempted to use its energy weapon as a means of diplomatic pressure in the process of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. But it suggested to lead the two negotiations in a single process and to push the progress in resolving the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh towards the rapprochement between the two countries. The historical and cultural ties that bind the Turkish people to those of Azerbaijan and the popular reaction that Ankara's policy has sparked in both countries, has made the Turkish government aware that without eliminating the causes that led to the closing of the borders, no action can be taken to remedy the effects. This position has relieved Baku and “dispelled all suspicions" as declared by the President Ilham Aliyev, following the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister on May 13, 2009. Azerbaijan considers its demand legitimate due to the fact that 20% of its territories are still under Armenian occupation. It has called on Turkey and the international community as a whole to adopt a common position and to stand firm in this situation, rather than to consolidate the Armenian position at the round table negotiations demanding open borders between Turkey and Armenia.

Azerbaijan has yet to give in to Russian requests to purchase all of its gas as they are looking to ensure the security of their resource routes by diversifying the pipelines in multiple directions. This is the reason for which, in the past, they postponed the exploitation of the second phase of the Shah Deniz well, expected to produce over 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum. Under the circumstances, Azerbaijan, which already exports gas to Turkey and Greece, was favorable towards the “Nabucco” pipeline project to transport the majority of its gas, although they can no longer infinitely await the Europeans. Furthermore, with its increased gas production, it is in need of markets and competitive prices which only Russia is taking the initiative to offer. During President Medvedev’s visit to Baku on the 29^th of June 2009, Gazprom proceeded to sign an agreement of purchase with the Azerbaijanis state petrol company (SOCAR) concerning 500 million cubic meters of gas as of the 1^st of January 2010. For Baku, this contract is based on commercial considerations with prices as high as 350 dollars per 1000 cubic meters of gas. For the moment though, the volume in question is too insignificant to be a fatal blow by depriving “Nabucco” of a reliable and vital source. In any case, the danger is not far off if the Europeans do not soon decide the fate of their projects and do not rapidly offer purchasing contracts to Azerbaijan. Wasting time could, in effect, put an end to this project. Even more so as the key actor in the region, which is Azerbaijan, constitutes a strategic transit zone for Central Asia which is among the top suppliers of “Nabucco”. Azerbaijan’s eventual change of course could incite the Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, to turn to Asia instead.  Let us be reminded that after the recent explosion on the pipeline between Turkmenistan and Russia, Turkmenistan has been made more aware than even of the vulnerability of their dependence on their large neighbor to the north. It is no coincidence that Turkmenistan’s authorities have recently proposed new opportunities to western companies in the exploitation of hydro-carbons. In this colossal game, the realization of “Nabucco” does not depend on Russian opposition with their competing projects such as “South Stream”, but largely on the engagement of European partners. In this relationship, the European Union has two strategic imperatives, the first being an improved level of cooperation with Russia, which is part of Eastern Europe, and the second being the continuation of the adhesion process for Turkey. It is in the strategic, balanced position that the right path can be found to its policies and the defense of its energy interests.

Olivier VEDRINE

President of the Atlantic-Ural College

Paris, FRANCE

Lecturer of the European Commission

(TEAM EUROPE France)

Fazil Zeynalov                                                         

Political scientist                                             

Baku, Azerbaijan

This text is also available at: http://blog.multipol.org/post/2009/08/01/ANALYSE-%3A-The-Oriental-Partnership-the-Geopolitical-Stakes-and-Azerbaijan

Thanks to the summit of Nice, the Union began its enlargement in 2003 towards countries that satisfied the adhesion requirements. With the negotiations concerning the adhesion of Turkey and of several Balkan countries, the EU opened the doors to many other States.

But we must question ourselves about the limits of the EU and launch a debate with our neighbors on our eastern borders. We have already established agreements for partnership, cooperation, and association leading to membership.

If we do not consider the development of a solid core, as an “avant-garde” for the political Union and a locomotive to integration, we will have to deplore the dilution of the European Union into a simple enlarged Union.

Our failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty and the difficulties of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, combined with the pressure on the enlargement, must encourage make a qualitative jump which will enable the Union to integrate all the new waves of adhesions within an institutional framework enhanced by a reinforcement of common policies. This “avant-garde” must be the first step of a process bringing the EU to build a better Union for the Mediterranean and a better integration of new candidate states.

Through a deep institutional restoration brought by the development of a Constitution and by the formation of a solid core, we would avoid the blockages accumulated since the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht and we would cease condemning Europe to impotence. We would give each other the means of escaping a possible crisis which, if our weaknesses were revealed, could lead to a regression and maybe even to a dislocation of the construction achieved since 1957.

It would finally be necessary to prepare the passage of the current Commission to a European government with a president, a vice-president and ministers. The president elected by universal direct suffrage would be the true executive chief, with the capacity to dissolve the Parliament.

For the Parliament, two houses are necessary; one must represent the citizens, the other the States.

The first “the House of citizens” would approach the current Strasbourg Parliament.

The second is a “House of nations” which would represent the States at a rate of some representatives per Member States with an equal number of representatives whatever the size of the state. In the case of a simple majority vote, one state = one vote. In the case of a unanimous vote, the decision is taken when all participants agree on it. One can ask the question of the balancing of the decision making weight of the states in the majority voting process by determining the number of votes that each will obtain in the future. One can propose demographic criteria, (already present in current calculation) which does not fit small states like Luxembourg, Belgium, etc… To avoid making “small states” become second class actors by reducing their decisional weight, it is necessary to return to the basic principles of international relations, namely: one State = one vote. Through this simple equation we are merely respecting the elementary laws of democracy. This constitution, as the Constitutional Treaty, must be formatted by an independent “Council of the Wise” which, thanks to the Internet, would make it possible for all citizens to take part in the discussions. This fundamental work and this formidable challenge, the elaboration of a constitution, would bring Europe into daily life. The participation of everyone could result in the beginnings of European civism. This goal supposes difficult reforms on the level of the European Union and on the level of Member States. The consequences for member states would be the consideration of engaging themselves in a new territorial distribution of power. As for Europeans citizens, the means to count in the global geopolitical game can be achieved primarily by the reorganization of our institutions. There are two possible objectives: the redefinition of the functioning of the European Commission and the search for a new decision making process at the Council of Ministers or the Council of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty is moving in that direction.

This renewal of the Union’s political framework will not be an easy task. Within the circle of Europe’s 27, as was made clear by the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and underlined by the difficulties faced by the Lisbon Treaty, there is no lack of adversaries to that goal. Furthermore, the elaboration of a solid core will not be well received by candidate countries; they will, in effect, feel faced with an added obstacle. Parallel to this, certain Central and Eastern European countries will show reluctance to join an excessively federal Union after living under the dominance of the USSR. Due to this they might show a legitimate need to keep their new-gained independence.

Thus we must, in this case, initiate a true political debate around the Union, a debate that must aim to inform and include all the States as well as the majority of their citizens. We could propose, due to the principles presented here in the ideas of a Constitution, an associate member chair in the Chamber of Nations, to candidate states. We could thus, thanks to a constitution, set up institutions which could deal with different conventions varying from associate member states to permanent members.

Faced with the strategic issues of the 21st century, a political construction of Europe is necessary; the new challenges cannot be simply managed by isolated States or by a system of intergovernmental co-operation.

In the center the “solid core”, governed by a Constitution of which the members belong to the European Union and who take part in the common internal security policies (Schengen space) and external (Defense policy) as well as the Euro area. The first periphery, the European Union Member States which do not wish to adhere to the Political Union. Finally, a last group would correspond to the applicant countries and/or to associated members.

This “solid core” would be the engine of the Union. This integration with variable geometry has the advantage to propose a pragmatic construction of the European Union. Each State can thus adapt its rhythm to the admission requirements of the political organization or decide not to adhere to it. By the development of these three “families”, one goes from total integration to continuous influence.

Olivier VEDRINE

This text is also available at: http://blog.multipol.org/